News Front
PRESENT INDUSTRY arrangements do not support clarity of decision-making, Office of Rail and Road Chair Stephen Glaister has concluded in his interim review into the disruption following the timetable change on 20 May. Professor Glaister’s interim report sets out an account of events before and after the change.
The review was commissioned by Transport Secretary Chris Grayling, and the full report including recommendations for change is due to follow by the end of the year. The interim report discusses factors contributing to the failure to develop and implement the May timetable, focusing on Govia Thameslink Railway and Northern. It suggests there were ‘systemic weaknesses in the planning and delivery of major network changes’ and concludes that ‘there is a risk of repeated disruption if the lessons are not learnt and acted upon’.
BLAME SHARED
The report shares blame for the problems between Network Rail, the two train operators, the Department for Transport and the Office of Rail and Road itself. NR is criticised particularly for the delays to the North West electrification of the Bolton corridor, with the report citing a ‘high-risk decision’ to try to catch up on behind-schedule work over the Christmas 2017 holiday period, before NR accepted in January that the work would not be complete by May. NR’s System Operator function is also criticised for not considering alternative options as risks emerged and for not doing more to estimate resource demands at an earlier stage. The review suggests if there was a ‘go/no-go’ decision point that was missed, it was in autumn 2017, although it notes judgements would have been better made earlier in August 2017 to align with the schedule for developing the timetable.
Northern is not blamed for the difficulties constructing the timetable given the electrification delay led to it having to rewrite timetables at short notice, but the report questions the operator’s confidence prior to the change that a full service would be able to operate and believes it ‘failed to adequately understand or communicate the risks arising from failing to have a sufficient number of trained drivers’.
On Govia Thameslink Railway’s part, the report says GTR could not have accelerated the crew diagramming process but did have a greater opportunity to plan and prepare its approach to driver training availability at an earlier stage. Passenger information and communications after the change took place were also found to be inadequate.
DfT is criticised for the timing of the decision to change the phasing of the Thameslink timetable. While originally proposed in the spring, DfT did not approve the re-phasing until October, and in the meantime GTR had to bid its original timetable in August, in line with standard industry timescales; the report suggests DfT approval of the re-phasing in time for August could have mitigated some of the risks involved.
On the part of the regulator, the inquiry found ORR failed to identify risks in the approach to the timetable change, with its investigation into Network Rail’s failure to meet timetabling deadlines not examining risks to operational preparedness.
It is suggested that ‘the diffuse nature of accountability for different programmes’ results in ‘a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities for the oversight and control of complex system risks’. While DfT’s Programme Boards are focused on the development of infrastructure, they do not consider systemic risks. The inquiry suggests the creation of the Thameslink Industry Readiness Board (IRB) was a recognition of the importance of focusing on system integration issues but that such a model ‘is not a sufficiently integrated or resourced approach to be an alternative to integration of systemic risks into formal programme management architecture’.
